Abstract-Wireless sensor networks allow attackers to inject false reports by compromising sensor nodes due to the use of wireless communication, the limited energy resources of the sensor nodes, and deployment in an open environment. The forwarding of false reports causes false alarms at the Base Station and consumes the energy of the sensor nodes unnecessarily. As a defense against false report injection attacks, interleaved hop-by-hop authentication was proposed. In interleaved hop-by-hop authentication, the security threshold is a design parameter that influences the number of Message Authentication Codes; the sensor nodes must verify, based on the security requirements of the application and the node density of the network. However, interleaved hop-by-hop authentication fails to defend against false report injection attacks when the number of compromised sensor nodes exceeds the security threshold. To solve this problem, in this paper we propose a security scheme that adjusts the security threshold according to the network situation using an evaluation function. The proposed scheme minimizes the energy consumption of the sensor nodes and reinforces security.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are densely deployed with many sensor nodes and use wireless communication [1] . WSNs are used in various applications that require real-time observation, such as fire detection and enemy movement detection [2] . For this reason, it is important to transmit accurate information to the Base Station (BS).
Security is an essential consideration in WSNs. WSNs are extremely vulnerable to false report injection attacks, due to their use of wireless communication, their deployment in open environments, and the limited energy resources of the sensor nodes [3] [4] . In a false report injection attack, an attacker injects a false report into a WSN by compromising certain sensor nodes. The BS causes false alarms upon receiving false reports. In addition, the forwarding of false reports unnecessarily consumes the energy of the sensor nodes. Therefore, false reports must be detected early and dropped before they arrive at the BS.
As a defense against false report injection attacks, Z. Sencun, S. Sanjeev, J. Sushil., N. Peng proposed Interleaved Hop-by-hop Authentication (IHA) [5] [6] . IHA is a security protocol in which sensor nodes detect and drop false reports during transmission if the number of compromised nodes does not exceed a certain Security Threshold (T). IHA is used when strong security is desired because it involves two-step report verification with one-hop neighbors and T+1-hop neighbors. However, IHA does not defend against false report injection attacks when the number of compromised nodes exceeds T.
In this paper, we propose a security scheme that determines a suitable T according to the network situation by means of an evaluation function. The BS resets T according to the network situation and alters the number of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to be included in the report. By resetting T, it is possible to defend against false report injection attacks when the number of compromised nodes exceeds T. As a result, the proposed scheme improves the total energy efficiency of the network and reinforces security.
The composition of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, false report injection attacks and IHA are described. In Section 3, the proposed scheme is described. Section 4 illustrates the performance of the proposed scheme through experimental results. In Section 5, conclusions are drawn. Fig. 1 depicts a false report injection attack in a WSN. An attacker compromises sensor nodes and obtains an authentication key. Then, the attacker generates a false report about an event that did not occur using the acquired authentication key. This causes a false alarm at the BS, and the sensor nodes consume energy unnecessarily during the transmission of false reports. There are various security protocols to defend against such attacks, including Dynamic En-route Filtering (DEF) and Probabilistic Voting-based Filtering (PVFS) [7] [8] . www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
II. RELATED WORK

A. False Report Injection Attacks
1) Node Initialization and Deployment
The key server is located at the BS and distributes and manages keys. The key server preloads unique integer IDs and individual keys onto all nodes. After node deployment, all the nodes discover one-hop neighbor nodes and establish pairwise keys with them [9] [10] . Fig. 2 displays the Association Discovery step, in which all nodes discover the IDs of association nodes. For the initial path setup, there are association discovery steps, such as BS Hello and Cluster Acknowledgement [11] . The BS Hello step allows the node to discover an upper association node. The BS broadcasts a Hello message. The node receiving the Hello message discovers the ID of a T+1-hop upper association node within the path. The Cluster Head (CH) receiving the Hello message allocates T+1 IDs to the cluster nodes. The Cluster Acknowledgement (ACK) step allows the node to discover a lower association node. After the BS Hello step, the CH transmits ACK toward the BS. The node receiving ACK discovers the ID of a T+1-hop lower association node. 
2) Association Discovery
3) Report Endorsement
If an event occurs, the cluster nodes generate an endorsement message including the MAC, and transmit it toward the CH. The CH authenticates the endorsement message using pairwise keys shared with the cluster nodes. If the endorsement message is authenticated, the CH generates an event report including the MAC, and transmits it toward the BS. Fig. 3 depicts en-route filtering in IHA. The node receiving a report from the CH verifies the report using a pairwise key shared with its downstream node. Then, the node checks the number of pairwise MACs within the report. The node verifies the last MAC within the pairwise MAC list of the report using the pairwise key shared with its lower association node. If the verification succeeds, the last MAC is eliminated from the pairwise MAC list. The node generates a MAC using the pairwise key shared with its upper association node and adds it to the beginning of the pairwise MAC list of the report. Then, the report is transmitted to the next node. All forwarding nodes repeat the same process. 
4) En-route Filtering
5) BS Verification
If a report arrives at the BS, the BS verifies the compressed individual MACs [12] . The BS computes T+1 MACs about the event using the authentication keys of the nodes in the ID list of the report. Then, the BS determines whether or not these MACs match the individual MACs within the report. If the verification succeeds, the report is authenticated. However, if the verification fails, the report is discarded.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Problem Statement
IHA is an effective security protocol that defends against false report injection attacks. However, it has several problems.
1)
IHA loses en-route filtering during false report injection attacks when the number of compromised nodes exceeds T. The event data of a false report that the number of compromised nodes exceeds T are false, but the report is composed of normal MACs. There are not methods to detect and drop such reports before the BS receives them.
2) In IHA, if the node receives a report, the node goes through a verification process with its T+1-hop neighbor node in addition to its one-hop neighbor node. IHA has powerful security, but the energy of the sensor nodes is consumed much more than with other security protocols.
To solve these problems, we propose the following solutions 
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3) The network administrator presets standard range of event data values of a normal report. The BS judges that a received report is false if it deviates from the standard range of a normal report set by the network administrator.
4) The BS minimizes the energy consumption of the sensor nodes as much as possible by determining the suitable T according to the network situation.
B. Assumptions
 We assume the energy of the sensor nodes is not limited.
 We assume the BS is not compromised. Fig. 4 demonstrates that after the BS resets T based on the False Traffic Ratio (FTR), Residual Energy of the Node (REN), and Max Hop Count (MHC), it broadcasts T. The evaluation function is executed whenever the number of received reports is 100. The BS performs the evaluation function considering the cluster in which the FTR is the largest and the REN is the smallest among the clusters in which the false report injection attack has occurred. The evaluation function is not executed if T is changed from the initially set T to a new T. The node detecting the false report deletes the false MAC without discarding the false report, and forwards the false report to the BS by adding the pairwise MAC of its upper association node. The BS can determine the number of compromised nodes and their IDs using this received false report. The BS determines the value to which it should reset T according to the number of compromised nodes. T should be reset to a value equal to the number of compromised nodes or greater than the number of compromised nodes. If all the nodes receive a broadcasting message to reset T from the BS, all the nodes will stop transmitting false reports after detecting them. Once T is reset, all the nodes operate by detecting and dropping false reports, as in existing IHA. 
C. Proposed Scheme 1) Factors Considered to Determine T
 Table 1 displays the output according to the inputs of the evaluation function. If the FTR is 0-10% and the REN is 0-100%, the BS resets T to a value smaller than the initially set T through the evaluation function. Then, the BS broadcasts T. At this time, the execution condition of the evaluation function is that the number of compromised nodes is smaller than the initially set T. This minimizes unnecessary energy consumption by the sensor nodes.
If the FTR is 11-100% and the REN is 0-100%, the BS resets T to a value greater than the initially set T through the evaluation function. Then, the BS broadcasts T. At this time, the execution condition of the evaluation function should be the situation of a false report injection attack when the number of compromised nodes exceeds the initially set T. In other words, the BS restores en-route filtering by resetting T to a value greater than the initially set T. Therefore, false reports are dropped before they arrive at the BS. Thus, it is possible to defend against attacks that cannot be defended against by the existing IHA.
Determining the suitable T involves adjusting T differently in various network situations, such as attack situations. 
2) Reassociation Setup of Nodes
The BS broadcasts the new T to all the nodes when T is reset as a result of the evaluation function. Fig. 5 depicts the process in which all the nodes reset T+1 association node pairwise keys with the new T. For example, if T is changed from 3 to 4, node u3 resets its upper association node pairwise key from to . 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Environment
The experimental environment is as follows: 2000 nodes are randomly deployed in the sensor field, which is 1000 x 1000 in size, and 2000 events are generated. The BS is positioned at (x, y = 1000, 1000) of the sensor field. The energy required to transmit 1 byte is 16.25 µJ, and the energy required to receive 1 byte is 12.5 µJ [13] . The energy required to verify a MAC is 75 µJ, and the energy required to generate a CH   u1  u2  u3  u4  u5  u6  u7  u8   v3   v1   v2   BS   T=3   u1  u2  u3  u4  u5  u6  u7  u8   v3   v1   v2   BS   3 4 www.ijacsa.thesai.org MAC is 15 µJ [14] . The size of a MAC is 1 byte and the size of the original report is 12 bytes. The size of the Hello Message is 30 bytes [15] . The initial energy resource of the nodes is 1 J. Fig. 6 displays the total energy consumption of the network according to the FTR in the situation of a false report injection attack when the number of compromised nodes is less than T. To demonstrate the energy efficiency of the proposed scheme, we generated 2000 events at random positions and analyzed the total energy consumption of the sensor nodes. As the FTR increases, the total energy consumption decreases. IHA maintains the initially set T. In the proposed scheme, the BS changes its broadcast value from the initially set T to the reduced T if the FTR is 0-10% and the REN is 0-100%.
B. Experimental Results
Comparing IHA and the proposed scheme, when the FTR is 100%, the energy efficiency is improved by up to 27.17%, as shown in Fig. 6 . Fig . 7 displays the total energy consumption of the network according to the FTR in the situation of a false report injection attack when the number of compromised nodes exceeds T. IHA maintains the initially set T. In the proposed scheme, when the FTR is 11-100% and the REN is 0-100%, the BS changes its broadcast value from the initially set T to the increased T. Comparing IHA and the proposed scheme, when the FTR is 90%, the energy efficiency increases by up to 24.18%, as shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 7 . Energy Consumption versus the FTR when the number of compromised nodes exceeds T. Fig. 8 displays the number of dropped false reports according to the FTR in the situation of a false report injection attack when the number of compromised nodes exceeds T. To demonstrate the security of the proposed scheme, we generated 2000 events at random positions and analyzed the number of dropped false reports. IHA maintains 0% en-route filtering, while the proposed scheme progressively improves en-route filtering as the FTR increases. Thus, the security of the proposed scheme is better than that of IHA. WSNs are vulnerable to false report injection attacks. IHA is an effective security protocol to defend against false reports. However, with IHA, it is impossible to defend against false report injection attacks when the number of compromised nodes exceeds T. In this paper, we proposed a WSN security scheme that adjusts T according to the network environment. When sensor nodes detect a false report that the number of compromised nodes is less than T, the BS reduces T and prevents unnecessary energy use by the sensor nodes through the evaluation function. The BS broadcasts an increased value of T when the sensor nodes detect a false report that the number of compromised nodes exceeds T. Therefore, en-route filtering is restored, security is enhanced compared to the existing IHA, and unnecessary energy wasting by the sensor nodes is prevented because false reports are discarded in advance. However, in the node initialization deployment step, all the nodes have many keys, so much of the memory of the sensor nodes is consumed. Therefore, in the proposed scheme, costs increase because expensive sensor nodes must be used. Through this experiment, we have demonstrated the performance improvement of the proposed scheme compared with IHA. 
